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INTRODUCTION
Since the first edition of The Basel Handbook was published in early
2004, major internationally active banks around the world have
continued to engage in substantial projects for designing and
implementing the extensive Basel II framework. To achieve the
advanced internal ratings based (AIRB) status, banks need to
develop a variety of credit models that estimate, for each obligor,
probability of default (PD) and, for each credit exposure or facility,
loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD). In devel-
oping the required PD models, many banks have had to redesign
or refine their risk-rating approaches. In this process, banks have
found it necessary to determine whether various PD measures are
“point-in-time” (PIT), “through-the-cycle” (TTC) or a hybrid,
somewhere between PIT and TTC.2
In the first edition of The Basel Handbook, we contributed a chap-
ter that introduced concepts for thinking about PIT–TTC PD issues
and presented preliminary empirical tests for measuring risk rating
accuracy. In extending our original PIT–TTC discussion, we
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describe here a framework for calculating both PIT and TTC PDs.
To achieve Basel II compliance at an advanced level, we believe
that a bank needs to implement this or a comparable framework.
The framework described here reflects broadly the one imple-
mented globally in May 2005 at Barclays Capital.3
We begin by reviewing the PIT–TTC principles presented in our
earlier contribution and highlighting the role played by measures
of overall, credit cycle conditions. We then describe a PIT–TTC PD
framework encompassing the following components:
❑ development of Basel II compliant PD models;
❑ design of a PD master scale that defines each internal risk-rating
as a PD range;
❑ calculation of a comprehensive set of monthly regional and
industry credit indices (regional and industry Zs);
❑ determination of monthly translations of agency ratings to one-
year PDs as controlled by a single factor for each set of agency
ratings (agency Zs);
❑ creation of an approach, drawing on the regional and industry
Zs, for converting the PDs from various, primary models into
pure PIT and TTC PDs; and
❑ estimation of PD term structures extending out five years by
averaging across Monte Carlo simulations of the Z factors and
the associated Z-conditional PDs.
We also outline broadly the implementation process that supports
the ongoing, monthly updating of the credit cycle and agency Zs,
the forecasting of the credit cycle Zs and the estimation of the
related PDs and PD term structures.
A REVIEW OF KEY PIT–TTC CONCEPTS
PIT–TTC overview
In January 2001, the Basel consultative document on the proposed
IRB approach published by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) offered the first formal distinction between PIT
and TTC PD estimates (see also BCBS 1999; 2000). Up to that point
PIT and TTC terminology for risk ratings had been used only infor-
mally within the credit ratings and risk literature. While the Basel
Committee at that time did not explicitly define the terminology,
they did start the process of identifying the detailed credit rating
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requirements that would ultimately be needed for satisfying the
Basel II framework.
To set the context for describing the design characteristics of an
integrated PIT–TTC PD approach, we summarise here some of the
key PIT–TTC principles articulated in our first chapter.
Over the last eight to ten years, various studies of bank credit
rating systems by the Federal Reserve (see Treacy and Carey 1998)
and other regulators and credit risk researchers have uncovered an
important distinction between PIT and TTC. Furthermore, they
recognise that the industry does not seem to have migrated
towards a consistent rating PD approach, as some banks contend
that they use mostly PIT ratings while others suggest they use
mostly TTC ones. Other banks use some kind of muddled combin-
ation of PIT and TTC.4 We see this lack of consistency as being
caused by the fact that, first, not all PD models produce consistent
PIT or TTC measures, and, second, not all of the key credit risk
objectives that drive a bank’s risk management processes can be
supported by one type of PD measure – be it PIT or TTC. For a
recent discussion of some of the design characteristics of successful
PD estimates, which includes the role of PIT–TTC distinctions, see
Ranson (2005).
In 2004 we argued that, ultimately, the type of PD estimates
required to support various credit risk measures needed to be
linked explicitly to the specific objective and its related time hori-
zon. For example, estimates of one-year expected credit losses
would most likely be more accurate if they used one-year PIT PDs
that fully reflected the current credit conditions prevailing at that
time. In contrast, assessing the risk/reward characteristics of a ten-
year primary exposure would, if assessed correctly, utilise a ten-
year PD term structure. Finally, the implied requirements
established by Basel II seem, by our interpretation, to be more
focused on TTC PDs, adding further impetus to the need for an
integrated PIT–TTC approach. However, the Basel II requirements
are still subject to interpretation as we discuss below.
Evidence on credit cycles motivates PIT–TTC distinctions
To start, observe that in distinguishing between PIT and TTC PDs,
one presumes the existence of predictable macro level credit fluc-
tuations – that is, the existence of a “credit cycle”. By a credit cycle,
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we mean that, if PDs in a broad region or industry are unusually
high, we can expect them to fall generally. Alternatively, if PDs are
unusually low, we can expect them to rise, although this may
occur more slowly and less predictably than the cyclical recovery.
This discussion assumes that one can identify an equilibrium
or “normal” state, which one might estimate with a historical
average.
This view departs from the prevailing 1990s credit model,
which assumes that systematic credit factors evolve as random
walks. Under this legacy model, the credit economy exhibits no
predictable cycles, only unpredictable fluctuations, and any cycli-
cal patterns seen historically are accidental, not indicative of
future patterns. In this case, looking forward, one does not distin-
guish between PIT and TTC PDs. In any future year, one expects
that the PDs in a broad representative population will be the same
as now. The PIT PDs are the only relevant ones for managing risk
generally.
While the existence of credit cycles is not by any means proven,
we find the intuitive notion of a credit cycle plausible for the fol-
lowing reasons:
❑ Public policy such as the Unemployment Act in the US implies
that monetary authorities will act to curtail recessions and, thus,
cause default rates to move predictably back towards normal
levels following an increase during an economic downturn.
❑ Rates series, including unemployment rates, inflation rates, rela-
tive commodity prices, relative currency values and interest
rates, are often found to exhibit mean reversion, which is tanta-
mount to a predictable cycle; thus, it wouldn’t be surprising to
find a cycle in default rates.
❑ Recent research finds evidence that stock price indices exhibit
mean reversion, which implies a similar pattern for credit –
credit indices themselves display cyclical historical patterns.
On this last point, we observe that the latent credit factors that we
have derived from various default and loss series are highly corre-
lated, and they exhibit historical cyclical patterns (see Figure 1).5
Using notation consistent with our earlier work (see Belkin,
Suchower and Forest 1998a, 1998b; Aguais et al 2004), we refer to
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these as Z credit cycle factors. These Z factors exhibit a zero mean
and unit variance. That is, when Zs are positive, credit conditions
are “better than historical average” and, therefore, PIT PDs are
“lower than their historical averages”. When Zs are negative the
reverse is true.6
In our research we have estimated time series models for fore-
casting the Z factors describing various sectors. The results indicate
that systematic credit factors exhibit statistically significant mean
reversion and momentum. By mean reversion, we mean that if a Z
factor deviates substantially from a long-run mean, it will tend to
revert towards that mean. By momentum, we mean that a Z factor
tends to move in the same direction as it has been moving. The
combination of mean reversion and momentum produces measur-
able cyclical patterns.
While, as noted earlier, no one has yet definitively established
the existence of predictable credit cycles, we find the evidence sub-
stantial enough to pursue models that allow for such phenomena
Figure 1  Normalised, latent credit factors derived from various default, Rating 
and loss series
Source:  Moody’s KMV, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Services and the Federal  
Reserve Board
Note:  Moody’s Med PD = index derived from median PDs in each Moody’s grade
Moody’s DR = index derived from Moody’s annual corporate default rates
S&P Med PD = index derived from median PD in each S&P grade
Moody’s DR = index derived from S&P’s annual corporate default rates
US Bank C/Os = index derived from US Bank C&I charge-off rates
MKMV median EDFs = index derived from median EDFs in North America
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as well as the limiting case of no predictability. In all cases but the
limiting one, the PIT–TTC distinction has important meaning.
Distinct PIT and TTC measures help achieve 
multiple objectives
We now define the terms PIT and TTC formally. A PIT PD assesses
the likelihood of default over a future period, most often the period
one year from now and sometimes the next two, three, five or even
ten years forward. An accurate PIT PD describes an expectation of
the future, starting from the current situation and integrating all
relevant cyclical changes and all values of the obligor idiosyncratic
effect with appropriate probabilities. Thus, a PIT PD corresponds
to the usual meaning of “probability of default” and is, in fact,
unconditional with respect to unpredictable factors. We attach the
“PIT” modifier for clarity in situations that also involve the TTC
concept. To estimate default losses accurately, a bank needs PIT
measures.
TTC PDs, in contrast, reflect circumstances anticipated over an
extremely long period in which effects of the credit cycle would
average close to zero. Some analysts report that they approximate
this result by using models in determining PDs over the next year
under the assumption that credit conditions over that period will
correspond to the average observed historically. Others report that
they determine TTC PDs and ratings by assuming a particular
stress scenario. In any case, such TTC PDs typically assume that
credit conditions in broad sectors will differ from those actually
expected. Starting from the current situation, such indicators are
conditional in the two cases above on credit conditions reverting to
the historical average or to a particular level of stress.
In practice, TTC PDs may largely represent ordinal measures.
Ordinal ratings display the same central tendency regardless of
whether overall credit conditions are strong or weak. Ordinal ratings
are analogous to those that teachers assign when “grading on a
curve”. Such ratings provide a ranking within a population at a
point in time, but they may prove misleading in comparing across
populations or across time. Because of that, one needs a calibration
equivalent to standardising test scores. In assessing default risk,
PIT PDs embody this calibration.
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Analysts sometimes derive TTC PDs by assigning to each com-
pany with a particular ordinal rating the long-run, historical aver-
age default rate of past companies with that rating. This approach
essentially assumes that the future default rate will correspond to
the historical average. The resulting PDs will describe the future
well, only, if both the ordinal grading process has remained the
same over time, and current and expected future economic condi-
tions are close to their historical average.
PIT PDs are essential to the management of credit risk. A bank
with only TTC PDs would not be able to quantify accurately its
actual risk looking forward. But, for some purposes, banks have
found it convenient to have both TTC and PIT PDs.
In deriving the PDs for use in calculating regulatory capital,
Basel II calls for the use of a “long-run average of one-year default
rates . . .” (see BCBS 2005, Paragraph 447). The FSA’s approach in
the UK calls for banks to “estimate PDs by obligor grade from
long run averages of default rates” (see Financial Services
Authority 2006, Paragraph 4.4.24). Some interpret these passages
as requiring banks to use TTC PDs. Actually, the words lend
themselves to different interpretations, since the estimation of
both PIT and TTC PDs involves averaging over many years of
data.
In estimating a PIT PD model, for example, one typically calib-
rates to data on many obligors across many years. One pools across
time, as well as obligors, as a way of increasing the sample size and
reducing sampling error. Even with such pooling that involves
averaging over time, the model will be PIT if it includes explana-
tory variables that track and therefore control fully for the state of
the credit cycle. Such a model would explain the temporal fluctuations
in default rates as arising from broad shifts in the ratings and PDs
of many obligors. In other words, cyclical changes would show up
as large-scale ratings migrations.
In contrast, one could also calibrate a TTC PD model to the same
default data. But the model would account for the temporal fluctu-
ations differently. Due to the assumed constancy of aggregate
credit conditions, ratings from the model would display close to a
fixed distribution over time. Thus, migrations would explain little,
if any, of the broad-based cyclical changes. Instead, such fluctua-
tions would appear, ex post, as wide variations in the realised
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default rates of each of the ratings. Thus, “averaging over many
years” doesn’t distinguish a TTC PD from a PIT PD, but a more
stable ratings distribution (and less stable default rates for each
rating) does.
Still, many view Basel II as calling for the use of TTC PDs, since
this implies stable estimates of capital requirements. Stability is
seen as a desirable attribute of a strategic capital reserve and some
regulators have expressed concerns that if banks were to use PIT
measures, they might overload their balance sheets during peak
periods prior to an economic downturn. (For a related discussion,
see Heitfield 2004).
Not surprisingly, bankers believe that wide fluctuations in
capital involving large liquidations followed by substantial recap-
italisations (or alternatively, large cycles in the amount of risk
taking) would prove highly inefficient and most likely impossible
to manage. Of course, one could apply optimal inventory meth-
ods in explaining the advantages of a stable capital reserve in
the presence of substantial fluctuations in portfolio risk (see 
Figure 2).
Recapitalisation threshold
Risk/capital ratio
Target
R
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k/
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Capital liquidation threshold
Adjustment only 
occurs here
Figure 2  Illustration of the infrequency of adjustment (stability of capital  
relative to risk) if managing capital using a target-threshold policy
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Under such an inventory-theoretic approach, a bank would
gauge its credit portfolio risk properly using PIT measures such as
the 99.9th percentile, next year value-at-risk, and the cyclical fluc-
tuations in those risk measures would change the ratio of risk to
capital. Over time, however, a bank would not act to control that
ratio unless it moved outside of an acceptable range. At that point,
the bank would bring the ratio back to a desired long-run target
and it could accomplish this by adjusting its amount of capital or
risk. However, if such adjustments entail large costs, the range of
acceptable values of risk per unit of capital would be large and so
adjustments would occur rarely. The use of TTC PDs seems an
expedient way of achieving the same objective.
However, in using the TTC solution, one must keep in mind that
the resulting calculations do not measure actual risk. One must
never lose sight of the actual risks, and, to paraphrase some
remarks by Gordy (2003), “one may stabilise the outputs, but not
the inputs”. We see that the optimal-inventory approach above
complies with this advice – the risk measure (the input) is PIT and
volatile, but nonetheless the bank might find it optimal to maintain
capital (the output) stable.
Banks may also find the TTC PD measures useful in guiding
some other risk management activities that rely on estimates of
long-run aggregate risks. Some banks, for example, use TTC PDs in
determining discretions, which are rules on the level of authority
required of people approving different amounts of exposure in dif-
ferent ratings categories.
Note, however, that while PIT PDs fluctuate much more than
TTC PDs, when averaged across a large portfolio, they need not be
much more volatile for the individual obligor. Most PD volatility is
specific to the obligor (idiosyncratic), and this volatility will remain
in a good TTC PD indicator.
Nonetheless, we observe in practice that individual obligor PDs
that arise from ratings or other information viewed as TTC often
are more stable than those that arise from ratings or information
viewed as PIT. This seems mainly a result of the differing frequen-
cies of the underlying model inputs. Many TTC indicators are
derived from low frequency information such as annual financial
reports. Many PIT ones involve much higher frequency informa-
tion such as stock prices. The higher frequency of the information
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contributes to the greater volatility of PIT PDs. But the stability in
the TTC indicators is artificial, caused by much of the information
on the current situation being hidden until the belated release of an
annual statement.
Despite the primary emphasis that we put on PIT PDs, we
believe that Basel II compliant banks need an integrated PIT/TTC
risk-rating and PD approach. We now turn to the design of this
dual PIT–TTC credit rating system. This overall approach encom-
passes the individual PD models of various types and the overall
PIT–TTC framework that is used to make various PD models
consistently comparable. Here, we emphasise the key role played
by the various PD models as we see credit ratings arising from PDs
– not the reverse. The framework provides one-year PIT and TTC
PDs for each borrower and assesses credit factor adjusted, forward
PD term structures.
DESIGNING A PIT–TTC DEFAULT RATING SYSTEM
Overview: key components of the rating system
To design a credit rating system that satisfies the requirements of
both Basel II and a firm’s own credit risk management objectives,
there are a number of key steps that need to be followed in devel-
oping the integrated components of the approach. Generally, banks
need to:
❑ develop Basel II compliant PD models covering all obligor types
or accounts and assess each model’s degree of “PIT-ness”;7
❑ define the overall rating master scale (ie, PD bins) as having a
number and spacing of ratings satisfying both regulatory and
management reporting requirements;
❑ formulate conversions of all PD models from their PIT–TTC
starting point into “pure” PIT and TTC PDs; and
❑ calculate accurate PD term structures.
These overall requirements reflect a solution that supports both
advanced risk management and advanced IRB Basel II objectives.
We discuss each component in turn below and then explain how
the overall framework comes together.
We see the PD models and ratings being developed and used
in accordance with an overall credit policy and protocol (see 
Panel 1).
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PANEL 1: ILLUSTRATIVE RATING PROTOCOL
Rating protocol
Rating occurs entirely through the use of approved PD models devel-
oped largely by the credit risk management function. Each PD model
is clearly designated as producing a PIT, TTC or hybrid one-year PD
output. Such models have clearly defined:
❑ inputs, including adjustments to vendor supplied models;
❑ formulas, embodying calibrations; and
❑ overrides to outputs.
Credit officers (COs) use these models in determining PDs and ratings.
In each application of a model, either the CO enters particular values
for the inputs manually or these are supplied by external third-party
vendors. Inputs may also be subject to validation rules. The formulas
then uniquely determine the one-year PD (or multi-year PD term
structure). Thus, only one PD (or term structure) is possible for any
choice of inputs. The CO may, at that point, override the model-
determined PD, given senior management approval. In the last step,
the rating master scale translates the PD into a rating.
To substantiate any override rationale, the CO may draw on sec-
ondary approved models, such as ones that convert between TTC and
PIT PDs and ones that forecast aggregate credit conditions in selected
segments defined by asset classes, regions and industries. Adjustments
and overrides are subject to regular monitoring and senior manage-
ment review.
In some asset classes, particularly within retail, the exposures to
individual obligors or accounts are small but extremely numerous,
and so the determination of PDs and ratings involves automated meth-
ods. COs intervene in exceptional cases and in reviewing pools of
exposures.
The approval of a model prior to their use in making risk and busi-
ness decisions includes a formal process: preparation of descriptive
documents; conduct of an external review; and presentation of the
documents and review to a technical committee for official sign-off.
Each model development document follows a standard format.
Among other things, the document must present the conceptual and
statistical evidence indicating that the model would predict accurately
and better than available alternative approaches.
In rating, COs must use an approved PD model, if available. If more
than one is applicable, a model-hierarchy policy determines the one
to choose. Models usually remain unchanged over annual intervals.
Most credit models are on an annual cycle of review, revision, and
reapproval.
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Developing Basel II valid PD models:
PD models form the foundation of any rating system. If a bank has
a credible PD model for each of its obligors, deriving the rating
becomes a simple process of classifying obligors into bins (ratings)
defined by PD ranges.
We see mostly four types of PD models, namely:
❑ single obligor statistical ones, in which one obtains a large repre-
sentative sample of company (or account) default and no default
outcomes and fits a model based on earlier values of company
(or account) credit indicators, that offer the best explanation of
the observed outcomes;
❑ approaches based on agency ratings, in which one translates
each agency rating to the PD that it currently implies;
❑ scorecard (expert-system) models in which one starts with often
subjective, ordinal measures of an obligor’s creditworthiness and
applies a conventional, low default portfolio (LDP) algorithm in
establishing a calibration based on a small sample of default and
no default observations (see Pluto and Tasche 2005); and
❑ derivative credit risk models in which one typically uses simula-
tion or stress methods in evaluating the likelihood of default and
loss on a structured position affected by the performance of an
underlying asset pool involving many obligors.
We could write extensively on the proper design and calibration of
each of these PD model types. However, we provide only a few
comments here, focusing on validation.
A bank may acquire models externally from vendors or develop
its own, using a combination of internal or external data. In any case,
the standards for validity remain the same. In our view, a valid
model must be both plausible conceptually and reliable statistically.
A plausible PD model will derive from a logical theory of the default
process. For larger companies, this usually means a Merton-type
approach, which might draw on variables beyond those in the origi-
nal Merton formulation. A reliable model’s parameters will:
❑ have correct arithmetic signs (/); and
❑ differ from zero at conventional confidence levels (eg, 95%).
Additionally, the PD model should outperform alternative, pla-
usible models in terms of goodness-of-fit. We find that PD model
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developers sometimes pay little attention to the plausibility of their
formulations. Whenever possible, we avoid such models.
Experience from a wide range of scientific fields indicates that
empirical approaches that search arbitrarily for close statistical fits
to a particular data sample produce models that may perform
poorly in practice (see, eg, Jefferys and Berger 1991; Findley 1993;
Clark 2000).
In their application, PD models often need to work under condi-
tions that diverge from those prevalent in a historical sample.
Highly calibrated, purely empirical approaches can lock onto rela-
tionships that hold only under a narrow set of conditions. With a
conceptually plausible model, one has a better chance of control-
ling for changes in the fundamental factors.
In evaluating a PD model’s goodness-of-fit, analysts commonly
examine rank-ordering performance. While this represents an
important aspect of performance, it does not tell the whole story.
A rating system could rank-order perfectly, yet, due to a poor cali-
bration, cause a bank to fail.
We evaluate goodness-of-fit primarily using likelihood mea-
sures, which when formulated correctly, include complex adjust-
ments for correlation. Likelihood measures consider both
rank-ordering and calibration accuracy together as discussed in
our previous Basel Handbook (Chapter 7).
By “calibration accuracy” we refer not only to the average PD for
an entire population but also to averages for various subpopula-
tions of higher and lower risk and to averages over different time
periods of broadly higher and lower risk. Indeed, estimation of the
long-run PD population average is comparatively straightforward.
The difficulty compounds when one turns to determining the
amount of PD change implied by various moves up and down an
ordinal default risk ranking as well as changes in the population
average over time. Properly formulated likelihood measures com-
bine all of these aspects of model performance. The measures
impose penalties if a model:
❑ ranks obligors poorly;
❑ fails to differentiate clearly periods of broadly higher and lower
risk; or
❑ under- or overstates the long-run population average PD.
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In managing the development of PD models in cases in which lim-
ited data preclude one from satisfying the usual reliability stan-
dards, banks will need to set conventions for determining
calibrations with less precision. Adapting the Basel II language, we
refer to such procedures as low default portfolio (LDP) calibrations.
We’ve experimented so far with two LDP approaches that involve:
❑ accepting parametric calibrations if the parameter estimates have
intuitively correct, arithmetic signs and plausible magnitudes,
even if those estimates have less precision than, for example, the
usually required 95% confidence of being different from 0; or
❑ applying the non-parametric, Pluto–Tasche algorithm, which
provides a calibration even in the most difficult case of no
observed defaults and entirely subjective, scorecard-based, risk
differentiation.
In each case, we require that, in backtests, the model indicates that the
default count would be equal to or greater than that actually
observed with a probability equal to a threshold value of over 50%
(eg, 60%). This condition usually implies that we shift the “best-fit”
calibration upwards – to broadly higher PDs. We justify this adjust-
ment by noting that, with only a small number of defaults detected, a
default undercount seems more likely than an overcount. Today’s cal-
ibrations often rely on default counts obtained by searching historical
records not designed for distinguishing defaulters from non-defaulters.
Considering the reluctance for defaulters or their creditors to adver-
tise such failures, one realises that such searches could miss some
defaulters and misclassify them as non-defaulters.
Defining a default rating master scale
A default rating master scale at each selected horizon corresponds
to a set of disjoint PD bins covering the entire range from 0 to 100%.
In establishing a master scale (set of PD bins), one would likely
consider such objectives as:
❑ satisfying business and regulatory needs for risk differentiation
by ratings;
❑ reconciling with external sources of credit information;
❑ providing similar differentiation throughout the risk spectrum; and
❑ aligning with legacy rating systems.
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Today’s large corporate bond and loan markets typically use
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch alphanumeric ratings for sorting obligors
into different risk classes. Further, Basel II often endorses the use of
agency ratings as a basis for determining regulatory capital. Thus,
to achieve the first two objectives above, one would likely need a
count and spacing of ratings similar to or more refined than the
alphanumeric scales of the ratings agencies. This would probably
entail 15 or more PD bins spaced like the agency, alphanumeric rat-
ings. If one wants more ratings, one would likely structure them to
roll up to the agency ratings.
We interpret the third objective as implying PD bins with close
to the same widths as measured by default distance (DD). Defined
as in the CreditMetrics (CM) model, DD has no drift and an annual
volatility of one (see Gupton, Finger Bhatia 1987). Thus, with rat-
ings bins having a constant width as measured by CM DD, one
would expect that companies in the different rating bins would
exhibit similar one-year probabilities of migrating one-rating, two-
ratings, and so on. This uniformity in credit migration simplifies
the development of ratings-based credit models with limited num-
bers of parameters. While one might desire greater differentiation
in the higher risk ratings (since as the PD rises, equal DD width
translates into wider PD width), the increasing PD volatility in
those ratings usually precludes this.
Sometimes historical information includes only old credit rat-
ings and not the underlying PDs or other information that provides
for a more granular differentiation. Thus, to make it easy to com-
pare or consolidate new and old information, an institution may
want any new ratings to reconcile with older, less granular master
scales. By this, we mean that the new rating bins or combinations of
the new bins should map one-to-one to the older ones.
Default rating master scale – an illustration
We now illustrate the design of a hypothetical default rating master
scale that:
❑ aligns closely with the 19 agency alphanumeric ratings;
❑ provides close to the same risk discrimination (measured by DD)
across the entire risk spectrum; and
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❑ offers a simple (non-dynamic) mapping to a legacy rating sys-
tem assumed to coincide with the seven agency alpha ratings for
simple illustration as in the PIT/TTC approach proposed here,
we use a dynamic agency approach as described in more detail
below.
We use DD width as the main measure for assuring similar risk differ-
entiation across the risk spectrum (see Table 1). We search for a DD bin
width small enough so that integer-number multiples of it line up
closely with the legacy ratings. In this example, we find that a width of
0.15 works most of the time. However, we observe that this produces
sparsely populated ratings at the extremely high-risk end (CCC
range). Thus, in that range, we use bins with a DD width of 0.30.
Table 1 Mapping of old to new rating scale and to S&P ratings
Old S&P* DD bins PD bins (%) New
ratings ratings
Max Mid Min Min Mid Max
1 AAA  3.72 3.58 0.000 0.010 0.017 1
2 AA 3.58 3.50 3.43 0.017 0.023 0.031 2
3 A/A 3.43 3.35 3.28 0.031 0.040 0.053 3
A/A 3.28 3.20 3.13 0.053 0.069 0.089 4
4 BBB 3.13 3.05 2.98 0.089 0.114 0.146 5
BBB 2.98 2.90 2.83 0.146 0.186 0.236 6
2.83 2.75 2.68 0.236 0.298 0.373 7
BBB 2.68 2.60 2.53 0.373 0.466 0.578 8
5 BB 2.53 2.45 2.38 0.578 0.714 0.877 9
BB 2.38 2.30 2.23 0.877 1.071 1.303 10
2.23 2.15 2.08 1.303 1.576 1.898 11
BB 2.08 2.00 1.93 1.898 2.273 2.709 12
6 B 1.93 1.85 1.78 2.709 3.213 3.792 13
1.78 1.70 1.63 3.792 4.453 5.204 14
B 1.63 1.55 1.48 5.204 6.053 7.006 15
1.48 1.40 1.33 7.006 8.070 9.252 16
B 1.33 1.25 1.18 9.252 10.558 11.992 17
7 CCC 1.18 1.03 0.88 11.992 15.259 19.069 18
CCC 0.88 0.73 0.58 19.069 23.411 28.252 19
CCC 0.58 1.84 4.27 28.252 37.070 99.999 20
D D 4.27   100.00 100.00 100.00 D
*Average historical relationship.
This example of a master scale illustrates the reasoning and trade-offs involved in designing a rat-
ing system.
10-BH-Aguasis.qxd  12/5/06  1:22 PM  Page 282
DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A BASEL II COMPLIANT PIT–TTC RATINGS FRAMEWORK
283
Formulating PIT–TTC conversions
This subsection describes an approach for converting PIT PDs to
TTC, TTC PDs to PIT, or even hybrid cases (PDs intermediate to
PIT or TTC) to pure PIT and TTC PDs. As discussed earlier, we
define a PIT PD as the unconditional probability of an obligor’s
defaulting in a future period, often the next year. As explained in
more detail above, these estimates reflect all information relevant
to the determination of that probability, including indicators of the
current state and outlook for the credit cycle.
We define a TTC PD as the expected PD, assuming that credit con-
ditions in the obligor’s sector (eg, region/industry/asset class
grouping) return to and stay in a cyclically neutral, normal state. By
“normal”, we mean “implying long-run average default rates”.
Since aggregate default rates exhibit skewed distributions, default
rates in a normal year will exceed the default rate in an average year.
In formulating the PIT/TTC conversions, we work with DD
measures. In our experience, every PD model draws on risk indica-
tors that imply a spot measure of DD. For large corporations, the
best models use indicators that, in combination, form a measure
closely related to the Merton DD concept. In other cases, the rela-
tionship is less close, but we still find a measure, intrinsic to the PD
model, that corresponds to spot DD. For example, one can always
derive a “synthetic” DD by applying the inverse normal function to
the shortest term PD yielded by the model. The degree of abstrac-
tion rises as one deals with asset classes increasingly distant from
large corporate borrowers, but, as indicated by its pervasive use in
the Basel II Accord, the concept still works.
In some cases, the spot DD measure reflects current economic
conditions and we regard it as point-in-time (DDPIT). In other cases,
the measure seems basically ordinal or it assumes that current con-
ditions are at a historical norm. We regard such measures as
through-the-cycle (DDTTC). Finally, the DD measure may partly
account for current conditions and we view it therefore as an inter-
mediate case between “pure” PIT and TTC.
We illustrate the full conversion from PIT to TTC in Figure 3. We
subtract the current cyclical component from DDPIT and obtain
DDTTC. The resulting DDTTC and the related TTC PD will still move
over time as a result of obligor idiosyncratic (but not systematic)
factors. Alternatively, if one starts with a DDTTC, one gets DDPIT by
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adding the cyclical component. The resulting DDPIT and PIT PD
will move over time as a result of both idiosyncratic and systematic
factors.
The average of PIT PDs across a broad portfolio will have con-
siderably higher volatility than the average of TTC PDs. For indi-
vidual obligors, however, the idiosyncratic component of credit
risk typically dominates and so TTC PDs will exhibit nearly as
much volatility as the PIT ones.
Assuming the existence of either DDPIT or DDTTC or a known
intermediate measure for an obligor or account, the derivation of
complementary PIT and TTC measures involves:
❑ identifying the current state of credit conditions in the obligor’s
economic sector (or sectors) relative to the historical normal state
(s); and
❑ using that information in adjusting the DD indicator to PIT or
TTC or both.
We outline these two steps below.
TTC DD = PIT DD – credit-cycle adjustment
DD
t
 PIT for population
  PIT for borrower
TTC  for population
 TTC for borrower
Credit-cycle 
adjustment
2.6
2.2
2.0
2.4
t
DD
Time
Time
Figure 3  Relationship between PIT and TTC default-distance
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Deriving credit indices for economic sectors
Sector credit indices measure average credit conditions for a group
of obligors or accounts that one identifies as representing an impor-
tant component of systematic risk. In developing these indices, one
typically partitions risk by asset class, region and, on the wholesale
credit side, industry. To construct such indices, one may:
❑ collect time series data on DDPIT for the largest, possible, repre-
sentative sample of obligors or accounts within the sector; and
❑ form a time series, summary measure (eg, mean or median) of
the individual obligor or account DDPIT measures.
This is a standard approach for deriving latent risk factors. One
obtains performance measures for a large, representative sample of
obligors or accounts and summarises them.
One might scale the summary results to reconcile with the
CreditMetrics model’s assumption that annual changes in systematic
risk factors have unit variance. One achieves this scaling by intro-
ducing a correlation parameter, (s), into the index construction, as
follows:
(1)
Z(s, t)  unit – variance, credit index for sector s
(s)  correlation or scaling factor for sector s
DDPIT(s, t)  summary PIT DD for sector s
SUMM  summarisation operator (eg, median, mean, weighted
mean)
S(s, t)  set of indices of obligors in sector s at time point t
f  obligor index
DDPIT(f, t)  PIT DD for obligor f at time point t
Var
t
 variance computed across all history.
One needs a “normal” Z value for a sector (Zn(s)) to be used in
estimating the TTC PD (PDTTC) for each related obligor. One might
consider using the past average value of Z(s, t). But, in most PD
Z s, t
s, t
(s
s, t SUMM f, t
f S s,t
( )
( )
)
( ) ( ( ))
( )




DD
DD DD
PIT
PIT PIT
∈
(s Var s, t s, t
t
) ( ( ) ( ))  DD DD 1
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models, the relationship between PD and DD (and therefore Z) is
non-linear and convex. Thus, this choice of Zn(s), when applied in
determining a PDTTC for each of the past sample of obligors, typ-
ically implies an average PDTTC that falls slightly below the histo-
rical average PDPIT and the historical average, realised, default rate
(DR  default count/total cases).
One therefore might instead define Zn(s) as the value usually
slightly below the Z(s, t) average that, when applied in calculating
PDTTC for each of the historical obligor samples, produces an average
that reconciles closely with the past average PDPIT. This seems com-
patible with the Basel II focus on reconciling with long-run average
default rates. One might formulate this approach as follows:
(2)
F1  inverse of the PD function for the sector
PD(s)  long – run, past average default rate for sector s.
While these formulas may seem abstract, in practice they usu-
ally become clear. Assume, for example, that one’s primary credit
indicators are one-year PDs computed under the assumption that
credit conditions evolve as Brownian motion processes. In that
case, one derives a DDPIT by applying the inverse normal function
to a PIT PD. Then, assuming that the sector has never experienced
a structural shift to permanently higher or lower PDs, one obtains
the sector’s normal DD by applying the inverse normal function to
the long-run, historical average PD or DR for the sector. In other
words, in formula (2) above, F1 corresponds to the inverse
normal function. Using that approach applied to MKMV EDFs,
which incorporate the Brownian motion assumption, one can
derive credit indices for listed companies grouped by region or
industry (see Figures 4 and 5). The correlation parameters used to
derive these Z index examples are derived as shown in equation
(1) above.
In addition to the Z factors measuring overall credit conditions
in sectors (regions and industries), we also construct another index,
which we use in deriving PIT PDs for agency ratings. We call this
index the “agency Z”.
Z s
F PD s
sn
( )
( ( ))
)


1
(
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Figure 4  Normalised Z indices for regional groupings as derived from MKMV EDFs
Source:  Moody’s KMV
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Figure 5  Normalised Z indices for industry groupings as derived from MKMV EDFs
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Agency ratings are used widely in gauging the creditworthiness
of wholesale counterparties. Many view these ratings as TTC
indicators, since the agencies describe their rating approach as
“looking across the cycle”. While we don’t find agency ratings to
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be pure TTC measures, they move much less than pure PIT ones as
overall credit conditions change. Thus, to get accurate PIT PDs
from agency ratings, one needs a modelling or mapping procedure
that adds more movement. The agency Z is the index that measures
the extent to which each agency rating’s current one-year PD
stands higher or lower than its idealised, long-run average, one-
year PD.
In our previous Basel Handbook chapter, we described this so
called dynamic mapping approach for translating agency ratings to
one-year PIT PDs. We’ve also tested the performance of these
dynamically mapped agency PDs in comparison with MKMV
EDFs on both a one- and five-year basis.
We currently derive a single agency Z that we apply across all
agency ratings for a given agency in estimating the current one-
year PIT PDs. While one can imagine distinct agency Zs for differ-
ent ratings or other different categories of obligors, we currently
find that sampling variations make more detailed adjustments
unfeasible. We define the agency Z as below:
(3)
AVG  average across all alphabetic agency ratings
1  inverse standard – normal distribution function
EDF(r, t)  median MKMV EDF for obligors with rating r at time t
EDF(r)  historical average of median EDFs for the rating r
PD(r)  idealised, agency, historical average default rate for rating r.
We apply this agency Z in translating each rating’s long-run
average PD to an estimate of its current PIT PD.
Be clear that this index is different from the sector Zs. Sector Zs
measure general credit conditions in, for example, a geographic
region or global industry. The agency Z measures the average cred-
itworthiness of companies within each agency rating, relative to its
respective, long-run, historical average. Thus, if migrations in
agency ratings were to track closely the overall credit cycle, agency
Zs would remain nearly constant. We find, however, that agency Zs
fluctuate widely (see Figure 6). This indicates that agency ratings
Z t AVG
EDF r t EDF r PD r
r
Agency ( )
( ( , )) ( ( )) ( ( ))

     1 1 1





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migrations explain a minority share of temporal changes in credit
conditions, with a much larger proportion picked up by changes in
the average creditworthiness of obligors within each ratings grade.
Using sector credit indices for making PIT–TTC conversions
Given a comprehensive set of sector credit indices obtained as
explained above and beta () coefficients measuring the loading of
each index on each obligor or account and factors, d(f) indicating
the degree from 0 to 100% that an obligor’s or account’s DD mea-
sure is PIT, we may convert between PIT and TTC PDs using the
formula below:
(4)
We indicate in (4) above that the DDs that derive from an existing
PD model may fall somewhere between the extremes of 100% PIT
DD
DD
PIT
TTC
( , ) ( , ) ( ( )) ( , )( ( , ) ( ))
( ,
i t DD i t f i s Z s t Z s
i t
n
j
   1  ∑
) ( , ) ( ) ( , )( ( , ) ( ))  DD i t f i s Z s t Z sn
j
 ∑
Figure 6  Normalised agency Z factor derived from S&P-rated firms
Source:  Moody’s KMV and Standard and Poor’s
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or 100% TTC. In practice, working with legacy PD models, the calib-
ration of “PIT-ness” as measured by the d factor may largely
involve judgement informed by scattered empirical results on
other, comparable models. For example, we’ve judged the extent to
which some financial ratio based models are PIT by comparing the
varying cyclical responsiveness of other financial ratio based mod-
els with and without the MKMV based DD gap as an explanatory
variable. Additionally, if a model purports to mimic an agency
rating approach, we might assign it the 30% PIT weight consistent
with the historical performance of agency ratings.
Note, however, formula (4) offers a recipe for translating a
legacy PD model that isn’t 100% PIT into a 100% PIT one. One need
only re-estimate the model with the relevant credit indices
obtained from another PIT PD model (such as MKMV’s) included
as additional explanatory variables. Since 100% PIT models pro-
vide the best predictors of default risk, we expect that most PD
models will in time become 100% PIT. In this case, one would need
only the second of the two formulas in (4) and the parameter 
would always be one.
Consider now estimation of the betas. If one starts with PIT DDs,
one may determine the betas by regressing a relevant sample of
obligor or account DDs on the corresponding credit indices. If one
starts other than with PIT DDs, one might initially use the betas
obtained by regression for an otherwise comparable, PIT model.
Or, better yet, one would include the credit indices in re-estimating
the PD model and obtain by means of that estimation both a 100%
PIT model and the betas for translating PIT DDs to TTC ones.
The task of implementing this approach across an entire bank to
develop consistent PIT–TTC PDs is formidable. One must develop
a large set of credit indices and determine credible estimates of beta
coefficients and indicators of the degree to which existing DD indi-
cators are PIT or TTC.
Developing PD term structures
To complete this section’s discussion of the design of the overall
framework, we briefly describe an approach for estimating obligor-
level PD term structures reflecting the anticipated credit outlook
and the risks in that outlook. The approach involves:
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❑ estimating second-order (mean reversion, momentum) time
series models of the stochastic evolution of the sector Zs and
then applying those models in deriving Monte Carlo simula-
tions of future Z paths;
❑ translating those sector Z simulations into PD simulations over
one-year and longer horizons by entering the simulated Z
changes (z) over a year as conditioning factors in a model of
annual DDPIT transitions;
❑ multiplying the simulated sequences of Z conditional transition
matrixes and, from the default columns of those multiplied
matrixes, obtaining sector PD scenarios over various horizons
for the different DDPIT bins; and
❑ averaging the PD scenarios over each horizon and thereby
obtaining PD term structures for obligors in each sector within
each DDPIT bin.
Long-run, average transition matrixes provide the calibration of
the default and DD transition barriers inherent to the transition
model. We combine agency default and MKMV EDF transition
data in deriving the barrier calibrations. We view the non-default
agency ratings transitions as underestimates of DDPIT transitions.
We use the MKMV EDF transition data for getting better estimates
of those non-default transition rates.
Banks often use such long-run average transition matrices to
project PDs over various horizons. This conventional approach
assumes that the credit outlook never varies and that any devia-
tions observed after the fact reflect entirely random events. Here,
we generalise this approach by allowing that the outlook could
vary at least a little in predictable ways as indicated by the various
Z models. In particular, those models generally anticipate mean
reversion in credit conditions. Thus, if conditions within a sector
are far below (above) average, the associated model would on bal-
ance project a recovery (deterioration). However, these same mod-
els foresee a wide range of possible scenarios around these central
tendencies.
As noted, the sector PD simulations provide term structures for
a selection of DDPIT bins. To avoid a loss of resolution, we treat
those term structures as applicable to the numerical mid-point
DDPIT in that bin. We then use interpolation in deriving PD term
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structures for each obligor with a DDPIT value intermediate to a
pair of mid-points (see Figure 7).
IMPLEMENTING PIT–TTC DEFAULT RATING SYSTEM
Having described the components and design approach of an inte-
grated PIT–TTC PD approach, we now turn to a brief discussion of
some aspects of a successful implementation.
As we have highlighted in both this chapter and our previous
work, to be successful in both managing credit risk and satisfying
Basel II, banks require a rating and PD approach that provides two
distinct views of PDs to support the multiple objectives banks must
satisfy. Once the framework is understood, the real test comes
about during implementation when an organisation needs in a
Kuhnian sense to change its risk rating paradigm in a substantial
way.9 By this we mean that an organisation needs a major shift in
its overall ratings perspective and its language of ratings and it
must apply one consistent overall framework. This is about sub-
stantial change, not improvements around the edges.
Year 3Year 2Year 1 Year 4
W
PD1
i1
PD5
i
PD5
firm
PD1
i1
PD1
i
PD1
firm
1W
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Figure 7  Region/sector five-year term structures
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Implementation
We view banks with a model history in assessing economic capital
consumption as those that will find the transition to using two PDs
easier. Only by using models to manage credit risk over several
years will it become clear that PIT and TTC models behave very
differently, and no single PIT and TTC rating indicator provides
either the breadth of portfolio coverage or the required level of
accuracy.
The Basel II mandatory use of “all relevant and available infor-
mation” in particular helps to clarify the path to implementing two
PDs per obligor. Without a ratings framework that allows the con-
sistent comparison of credit risk indicators on both a PIT and TTC
basis – a credit officer is essentially comparing apples with oranges
in attempting to derive an accurate measure of the client PD.
Unique client identification, the management of client hierar-
chies and supporting reference data are critical to the implementa-
tion of a PIT/TTC ratings framework. These steps are required to
successfully link desktop, batch and monitoring applications so
Risk rating 
application
Stress test and analytics environment
New 
Z measures
PD calibration
Previous 
Z measures
Impact – Previous Z 
Z 
Change 
impact 
analysis
New/
Previous
PD
PD calculator 
batch
New 
Z measures
Impact – New Z
PD
PD calculator 
Desktop and batch
PD
PD monitoring
Approved Z 
update
Risk review function
Figure 8  Monthly Z credit-factor estimation process
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that PDs for many thousands of clients can change automatically
on a frequent basis without manual intervention.
Calculating PIT and TTC PDs across the client portfolio starts
with the estimation of various region, sector and agency Z factors.
This is represented in Figure 8 as the manual PD calibration batch
process conducted within the risk review function.
New Z values are then applied to a static portfolio to assess the
impact on client PIT and TTC PD values. Results are forwarded to
senior management for approval, and desktop and batch applica-
tions are tested with new Z parameters prior to implementation
within the live production environment.
Finally, changes in PIT and PD values are subject to regular
monitoring to ensure any continuation of overrides or significant
movements are reviewed and approved by appropriate personnel
in line with internal policy guidelines.
SUMMARY
In this follow-up chapter to our first Basel Handbook contribution,
we have extended the discussion of PIT/TTC concepts and related
issues to include the specification and design of an integrated
PIT/TTC PD approach. Discussed in the context of wholesale
credit risk specifically, this approach can be adapted more gener-
ally across all of the various obligors and portfolio types within a
large, internationally active bank, albeit with differences in data
and application for the retail, SME and wholesale worlds.
Our conclusions remain the same – any bank looking to satisfy
multiple objectives across both internal credit risk management and
Basel II requires a consistent multi-PD solution. The main evidence
motivating this need for both PIT and TTC PDs rests on the empiri-
cal existence of statistically measurable credit cycles. Not only do
latent credit factors derived from various default and loss series
show high correlation over the last 20 years, additional research
shows that the phenomena of both mean reversion and momentum
are statistically observable in forecast models for these factors.
Once it is understood that credit cycles exist at some measurable
level, we observe that PIT and TTC PDs are not differentiated sim-
ply by a random walk process as legacy credit factor models
assume. Therefore, observable systematic behaviour leads us
directly to the key conclusion that PIT and TTC PDs are separated
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by a measurable difference – statistical credit cycles. Ultimately, the
integrated PIT–TTC system described here is motivated by both the
need to support multiple objectives and the existence of measur-
able differences in PIT and TTC PDs.
The rest of the discussion has provided what we believe are the
foundations of an advanced approach, which includes appropriate
validation of PD models, a well-designed master scale, a focus on
PDs but not ratings, the overall conversion apparatus using credit
factors to ensure PIT–TTC consistency, and, finally, an approach for
extending PD term structures beyond one-year to incorporate the
cyclical nature of credit risk. In the end, the world is always evolv-
ing, and what we presented in 2003 as a discussion and overall tax-
onomy for thinking about PIT–TTC issues has now evolved into a
fully integrated PIT–TTC approach that has actually been imple-
mented on a global basis.
1 The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of a number of Barclays colleagues
who have contributed to the overall debate and implementation of a PIT–TTC ratings frame-
work, including, David Williams, Keith Ho, Tim Thompson, Ian Wilson, Peng Cheng and Yen-
Ting Hu. In addition, others who have provided helpful ideas especially include Brian Ranson,
who remains forever happy to engage in active dialogue on credit risk issues. We would also
like to thank Moody’s KMV for the use of their global EDF data. Finally, we thank the editor,
Michael Ong for his helpful comments during the editorial process. All errors remain the
responsibility of the authors. The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of Barclays Bank PLC.
2 For the purposes of this chapter, we will generally use PD to refer to both “credit ratings”
and probabilities of default. Further below, we explain some more subtle differences
between these two concepts.
3 Overall, this approach and discussion is oriented towards corporate counterparties; how-
ever, the overall framework is just as applicable to retail and SME customers.
4 For a further discussion of bank rating systems and PIT–TTC issues, see also BCBS (2005).
5 We derive the Z series for a sector by: (i) computing a summary PD measure, often a median
or imputed average; (ii) applying the inverse normal function to the summary PD; and (iii)
normalising the resulting series so that annual changes have a mean of 0 and standard devi-
ation of 1. The summarisation creates latent measures of systematic risk. The inverse normal
transformation creates series with close to normal rather than skewed distributions. The nor-
malisation produces series with properties compatible with the CreditMetrics model (see
Gupton et al 1997) of conditional PDs and ratings transitions.
The series that derive from median MKMV EDFs, US bank charge-off (C/O) rates, and
agency yearly default rates provide measures of the credit cycle in various sectors. The series
based on median MKMV EDFs for each agency rating are used in translating these ratings to
PDs. While not, strictly speaking, credit cycle indices, agency rating based series have been
correlated historically with the true credit cycle indices. In particular, they reflect the part of
the credit cycle not picked up by agency ratings migrations and, instead, tracked by changes
in the PDs of each agency grade.
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6 We generally refer to this historic comparison of various latent credit factors as a “credit
cycle Rorschach test” (the Rorschach test is used by psychologists and involves the interpre-
tation of ink-blot images by subjects).
7 Assessing the “degree of PIT-ness” for hybrid indicators that are combinations of PIT–TTC is
key to being able to estimate consistently both fully PIT and TTC PDs. Our approach is to
define MKMV EDFs as the PIT benchmark in the sense that these one-year EDFs reflect
nearly continuous updates of information on current credit conditions. In contrast, scorecard
types of models may use expert judgement assessments and possibly annual financial data
that are not updated frequently. In designing this framework we assess each PD model as
lying along a continuous PIT–TTC spectrum, ranging from MKMV EDFs as the PIT bench-
mark to internal scorecard types of model, which we define usually as TTC, if the informa-
tion content inherent in these is updated only infrequently.
8 The historical Z factors are used to make the adjustments in the likelihood calculation to
achieve the required statistical independence.
9 The move to an integrated PIT–TTC approach as discussed in this chapter represents a para-
digm shift in the way most banks implement their PDs and credit ratings (see Kuhn 1962).
Therefore, as Kuhn describes, it requires a substantial change relative to current thinking.
10 And, in the case of deal evaluation beyond one year, PD term structures need to be considered.
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